Abstract. Human engagement with the world develops and evolves into increasingly social, complex, and explicit modes. This essay examines the evolution of meaningful human engagement from simple embodied activity, to language-less social praxis, and then to praxis incorporating increasingly rich forms of linguistic action, culminating in theory. Each mode of meaningful engagement creates a space in which new modes of meaning can develop. These new ways of experiencing, acting, and communicating create their own meaning contexts, which provide the settings for the further evolution of humans' phenomenological, hermeneutic, and practical involvements. Each mode of meaning gives rise to its successors, allowing humans to acquire new powers to understand and manipulate their environments and each other. This increase and refinement of human power raises ethical issues that we address using the Gadamerian concept of dialogue.
Human engagement with the world develops and evolves into increasingly social, complex, and explicit modes. This evolution occurs at the levels of the species, cultures, and individuals. Each mode of meaningful engagement creates a space in which new modes of meaning can develop. These new ways of experiencing, acting, and communicating create their own meaning contexts, which provide settings for the further evolution of humans ' phenomenological, hermeneutic, and practical involvements. This essay examines the evolution of meaningful human engagement from simple embodied activity, to language-less social praxis, and then to praxis incorporating increasingly rich forms of linguistic action, culminating in theory. Individuals, cultures, and the human species all have followed this course of development. We the authors indicate how each mode of meaning gives rise to its successors, and how humans acquire new powers to understand and manipulate their environments and each other with each achievement. This increase and refinement of human power raises ethical issues that we address in our concluding section.
Praxis Gestalts
Humans begin individually as the human species began, as bodies engaging with the world in non-mechanical, meaningful ways. The openness to the world provided by organisms' undifferentiated fusion of perception, feeling, and activity facilitates their becoming social, so that their perceptions and actions are not strictly and solely their own. Certain Merleau-Pontian and Heideggerian concepts provide appropriate resources for describing this primal form of embodied and practical being-in-the-world. For ease of understanding, the examples in this section concern everyday human encounters rather than the experiences of organisms unable to engage in social practices or to use language.
1 Because humans always remain embodied beings no matter what further abilities to engage meaningfully with the world they may acquire, the fundamental phenomenological and practical facts of being bodies in the world apply to them just as they do to other animals.
In The Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty describes human existence as bodily involvement with an always already meaningful world. This engagement partly consists, Merleau-Ponty claims, in our grasping the meaning of the scenes we encounter all at once, as Gestalt psychology describes, rather than in discrete steps that are then synthesized, as proposed by more objectivist theories. Foregrounds appear in perception framed by backgrounds that are at once literal and figurative. For instance, the background against which someone's cup can appear as a foreground can include at once the visual background of the table on which it sits, set against the rest of the room, and this person's thirst and feel for how to go about drinking the cup's contents. Humans encounter objects, events, and each other through perceptions structured by their emotions and pre-reflective sensitivities. The backgrounds of their perceptions are simultaneously perceptual and practical.
Human life consists largely and most fundamentally in people non-deliberatively finding their way through successive situations by experiencing gestalts that call out for particular actions. For an experienced basketball player, a particular formation of teammates and opponents looks and feels like a situation in which he should throw a bounce pass to where one teammate is headed. For a teenager, someone walking by her house wearing certain clothes looks and feels like someone who should be ridiculed. Merleau-Ponty's account of human embodiment explains how people achieve their senses for how to go on in various circumstances, and how these senses frame the way the world appears to them. His account does not adequately elaborate the social conditions of this embodiment, the means by which humans not only inhabit a world, but share it. Theodore Schatzki's Heideggerian conception of practical intelligibility develops Merleau-Ponty's account, indicating how humans not just attune themselves to their situations, but do so in socially structured ways.
In his Social Practices and The Site of the Social, Schatzki presents a conception of practical intelligibility, which we gloss here as agents' understanding of what it makes sense to do, say, or think in a particular circumstance.
2 At the supermarket, for instance, it may make sense to someone to purchase something for dinner. This signifies to her that she needs to pay, which in turn signifies that she needs to stand in line, which itself means standing in this particular line right now. Merleau-Ponty explained that an action makes sense to someone to do at a given moment by appearing to that person as the unquestioned foreground of the scene in which he is immersed. Practical intelligibility explicates the further meaningful background of these Merleau-Pontian praxis gestalts in how sometimes distant ends frame situations via chains of signification (as in the supermarket example above). As we will explain in the next section, the ends-means relations of practical intelligibility are the crucial aspect of human existence that anchors people in shared, social worlds.
Human life overwhelmingly consists of agents experiencing series of praxis gestalts and carrying out the coordinated actions specified by practical intelligibility, in the process altering their environments and changing the backgrounds of their situations, which in turn leads them to specifications of what is to be done next. Skillfully matching their behavior to the ever new situations to which they effortlessly are attuned is how people principally inhabit a world meaningfully, even in the absence of language. Humans' bodily immersion in praxis gestalts provides the essential starting point for any adequate account of how they can live together as parts of wholes greater than themselves. All further meaning structures of individuals' lives depend upon their prereflective abilities to perceive environments as calling out for particular actions. Their taking part in a culture, history, or tradition requires that people's praxis gestalts are sufficiently homologous that they understand one another. Social practices explain how such understandings operate.
Social Practices
The openness to the world intrinsic to the human body is the necessary base for developing further capacities to engage meaningfully with the environment. In particular, their embodiment allows humans to attune themselves to each other and their surroundings by sharing social practices. The sharing of social practices consists first and foremost in their attuning themselves to their environments and to each other in harmonious ways. This mutual attunement is the necessary substrate for the later addition of simple forms of language to humans' practices.
The composition and structure of praxis gestalt backgrounds is key to the functioning of these gestalts. As backgrounds change, different foregrounds stand out in different ways. These gestalts are not purely visual entities to be dealt with. MerleauPonty himself recognized that visual experiences are simply abstractions from prior and more encompassing involvements in practical, action-oriented scenes. Drawing on Schatzki's concept of practical intelligibility, the previous section filled out this phenomenological finding by treating praxis backgrounds as primordial syntheses of sensory components with agents' skills, understandings, and signifying chains. For instance, when it makes sense to someone to stand up and close his door because the argument in the hallway has gotten too loud, the background to his praxis gestalt necessarily incorporates his understandings of what counts as too loud and of how loudness in the hallway can and should be handled.
At any given moment in any particular situation someone could experience nearly endlessly varied gestalts, with different understandings and purposes structuring them.
Without some means of organizing those gestalts, people would likely find themselves amidst what William James called a "booming, buzzing confusion." We propose that this organization derives principally from social practices. People share such practices via their ability to "sift" gestalts into roughly familiar, shared categories. It is through this sifting that people dwell in common worlds.
Typically, a situation's background will be defined principally by the reciprocal relationship between its physical arrangements and the organization of relevant social practices. As an example of this reciprocity, consider that humans build roads because roads facilitate already extant practices such as walking, riding, and driving, and that the resulting infrastructure then stands as a background for its making sense to walk, ride, and drive on subsequent occasions, which may in turn signify maintaining or extending the network of roads. Such relationships are at work throughout the human environment, as familiar examples of restrooms, kitchens, and bedrooms attest. For instance, beds belong in bedrooms because that is where people sleep. Bedrooms are where people sleep because that is where the beds are. And the bed standing in my bedroom as I enter it late at night looks like where I should soon lie down. If my bed were not there, I would miss it, and would feel the need to procure one. Through repeated encounters, humans become attuned to their situations, developing a felt sense of how to go on in the seamless flow of their experiences with the equipment they use in their activities. This attunement is the central organizing facet of practices. The harmonious, mutual attunement of different individuals makes practices social.
Following Schatzki, we conceive a practice as a temporal structuring of means, typically motivated by emotions, aimed at particular ends.
3 Cooking, farming, and driving practices connect behavioral routines such as blackening fish, putting up hay, or pulling over the side of the road to make room for emergency vehicles, to respective goals such as making dinner, feeding the cattle, and getting safely to one's destination and respecting the law. Paradigmatically, a practice prescribes a sequence of actions, directed toward specific or general results; and these actions and results matter to participants in the sense that they feel appropriate love, fear, sadness, or joy, and so on, in undertaking the relevant activities.
By taking part in social practices and engaging particular situations in accord with appropriate structures of ends, means and emotions, humans are enmeshed in meaning contexts that range from the simple and local, such as bathing, walking on a crowded street, and playing the children's game "tic-tac-toe," to the immensely complex and expansive, such as buying a home, sponsoring a law before the legislature, and challenging the authority of a church. Social practices provide the principal background both by which human beings make sense of their worlds and each other, and by which they explicitly interpret their situations, themselves, and other people. Some practices operate in relative independence from other practices, consequently serving as relatively self-sufficient backgrounds for interpretations. Other practices are nested so intensively and extensively in further practices that interpretations of that which endures or occurs within them can vary nearly endlessly as interpreters' perspectives shift between different configurations of the praxis background.
Most greetings count as instances of comparatively simple praxis contexts. For example, when two friends enter the same physical space after a certain period of not seeing each other, the gestalt each experiences might foreground greeting the other. We can explicate even such a basic end in different ways, designating the greeting itself, the renewed acknowledgement of friendship, or both as the ultimate ends of this practice in a particular instance. Variations in their circumstances, such as one friend noticing a more pressing need than a greeting, such as a child in danger who needs his immediate help, can shift what it makes sense for either friend to do. Consequently, there are variations in human behavior in similar, or even in seemingly identical, situations, which can make it difficult if not impossible to formulate rules governing that behavior. Furthermore, the ways that people's behavior differs even in subtly different circumstances can be highly idiosyncratic. In order to take part in shared social practices, humans need not share precisely the same understandings of how to go on. They need only be sufficiently attuned to each other and their situations to go on unproblematically, so that their understandings themselves are not called into question. 4 Following Ludwig Wittgenstein, we call this the "foot finding" requirement of sharing practices: people share practices to the extent that they find it easy to understand and interact with each other, find it easy to avoid or to deal skillfully and satisfyingly with potential disruptions in their activities. Obviously, although greeting practices occur in all human cultures, who is greeted, when, and how can differ greatly among them, with means ranging from handshakes to bows, shouted greetings, and subtle head nods, and emotions varying from effusive, friendly joy to demure, submissive respect, and so on.
Other practices make sense the way that they do only because they have a place in further networks of practices. Such networks can occur in any area of human life, but are typically most obvious in institutional fields such as medicine, education, and agriculture.
5 Activities such as taking blood pressure and reading oxygen levels can make sense to those carrying them out or to those observing them without their grasping the full import of those tasks in the elaborate chains of ends and means to which these features likely belong, aimed at the care of patients and perhaps also to the financial soundness of the hospital. Finding one's way in such nested practices consists in gradually expanding the hermeneutic circle within which their scenes make sense. The background against which a nurse finds a particular action the one to carry out at a particular moment will typically include praxis factors not apparent to non-medical personnel in the immediate situation. For example, a nurse may read his patient's oxygen level in conjunction with his further understanding of the different treatments available to her depending on whether her levels rise, fall, or remain stable, even if these understandings are not in any way a part of his explicit deliberations. Rather, his feel for the operation of a range of related practices motivates his directedness toward particular ends-means combinations. By comparison, children often grasp the visible structure of a practice without understanding the broader purposes that the tasks they observe serve. They may pretend to be doctors by taking each other's blood pressure with toy or real devices, imitating the easily observable activities of a nurse without a sense of the further praxis context of those actions, and hence of their full meaning.
Mastering a culture entails becoming sufficiently attuned to the extended praxis contexts of activities a person can find her feet with others in such complex circumstances as unproblematically as she can in practices as simple as the greeting example considered above. Doing so will extend this person's hermeneutic circle to include the further practices into which her and others' activities are nested, enriching the background against which her praxis gestalts will form. Although the medical examples above likely require the employment of language, practices can be nested in one another without language supporting the extension of participants' understanding of these further praxis contexts. Being attuned to each other in social practices allows people to be open to new and shifting meaning contexts that extend and enrich their worlds beyond their immediately perceived situation. Humans' openness to shifts in meaning, developed in their mastery of praxis networks, is what allows them to add simple language to their activities.
The ends, means, and emotions carried in social practices supply the core elements that compose the backgrounds of the praxis gestalts that specify what it makes sense for agents to do. Through a variety of means, only a small portion of which is explicit instruction, human beings become oriented to their varied situations, making use of their remarkable abilities to attune themselves to each others' interests and intentions on the basis of scant evidence. In acquiring the embodied orientations that allow them to take part in shared practices, people come to share complex worlds where otherwise they would only share physical space. The latter is what they experience in extreme cases where two or more members of radically foreign cultures attempt to interact and simply fail to make sense of each other's behavior. Independently of all articulation in language, taking part in social practices immerses people into worlds in which the meanings of encountered objects, events, and people resolve into practical understandings of what makes sense for them to do. The mutual attunements that comprise the fundaments of social praxis allow humans to share and jointly develop ways of engaging with the world meaningfully without necessarily employing language. The simplest forms of language develop out of the meaning contexts provided by language-less social practices.
Sayings and Articulation
The most basic forms of language differ only subtly from non-linguistic practical activity and grow naturally out of humans' mutually attuned interactions in social practices. Linguistic actions alter the practices out of which they develop, and themselves develop into increasingly complex and explicit modes of manifesting meaning. In order to see how language fits into praxis it is instructive to consider two concepts central to Schatzki's practice theory: doings and sayings. Doings are physical behaviors directed at effecting some instrumental change in the world, whereas sayings are physical behaviors aimed at contributing to the intelligibility of situations by largely non-instrumental means. For instance, picking up a broom in order to sweep the floor is a doing, and uttering, "This place is a mess" is a saying. These terms designate different ends of a continuum ranging from those behaviors directed entirely at instrumental purposes to those with exclusively expressive aims. Doings may be divided into behaviors that contribute to the intelligibility of situations only by changing the physical conditions of those situations and behaviors that combine instrumental and expressive functions. Although there is a continuum here too, for simplicity's sake we will call the former actions "brute doings" and the latter "signaling doings." The structures of ends, means, and emotions form the organization of social practices, and doings and sayings comprise the primary substance of praxis, that which is most directly organized.
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Consider a social group restricted to brute doings, incapable of producing either sayings or signaling doings. Their mutual attunement would be solely directed toward their common situations and to changes in their environments, including those induced by each other's brute doings. They would lack the capacity for the further understandings made possible by signaling doings and sayings. The social life of this group would constitute the minimal level of interactivity and mutual attunement required for social practices.
Signaling doings could develop naturally in such a social setting. The crucial addition to this simple culture would be the recognition on the part of the audience of the instrumental objective of others' brute doings. Any doing can signal if its audience understands how that doing and its effects will fit into the flow of praxis. To adapt a familiar example, imagine Wittgenstein's builders A and B at work but unable to make their calls of "slab", "brick" and so on. 7 A grabs building blocks and places them on one another, while B helps by fetching more blocks to replace those that A is using, occasionally placing some blocks himself. A signal could arise through A's and B's interactions simply by B coming to recognize that A's reaching for a brick indicates the signifying chain initiated by his putting that brick in place, which signifies that he will need more bricks soon, which signifies that B should fetch more bricks now. Once B begins to react appropriately to A's brute doings as signals, A need only recognize that B's behavior is attuned to A's behavior for their doings to begin to become pure signals.
In this sort of mutually attuned, interactive situation, the doing itself can exchange instrumental power for ease of performance and intelligible power. That is, if B can know from A's grabbing a brick and building with it that B should fetch more bricks now, it can be possible for B to gain the same sense of what should be done next from A's grabbing a brick and then holding it rather than placing it. In this case, A's physical act of picking up the brick changes the practical intelligibility of the situation as much or more by signaling to B as by altering the physical environment. Once such actions have become established in the builders' practices, it is appropriate to call them "signaling doings" rather than "brute doings." This development from instrumental actions to non-instrumental actions can continue further. A could, for instance, use a more abbreviated gesture that looks like grabbing a brick without his actually needing to pick a brick up, or without there being a brick nearby for him to pick up. At the point where the instrumental functions of some of A's and B's performances have reached the vanishing point, and their value is entirely in their contributions to what they are signaling the builders that it makes sense to do, it is appropriate to say that this social group employs simple sayings, the most basic form of language.
In saying something, whether by a gesture or with a call such as, "slab" or "brick", speakers articulate some aspect or aspects of their praxis. Independent of their ability to use language, humans engage meaningfully in the world through their embodied feel for what it makes sense to do, in accord with how things appear to them in their situations ordered by their social practices. Sayings can in principle make explicit 8 any component of this engagement, including the objects and equipment with which people cope, and the structure of their coping, such as the ends to which they are directed, the means by which they intend to pursue those ends, and the normativity of their activity, expressed in terms of "ought", "should", and similar vocabulary. Even uses of simple language reveal the world praxis has already created, but in ways praxis alone cannot.
Simple sayings can fit neatly into the structure of their home practices, fulfilling their roles much as each piece of equipment plays its part in a Heideggerian equipment totality.
9 This is the point of many of Wittgenstein's studies of language games. The builders' calls for different blocks function in their building practices much as hammers, nails, and other tools do in a Heideggerian workshop, coordinating with the other components of the activity with an eye toward the completion of various projects, and drawing their meanings from their roles in this orchestration. Even this most fundamental mode of language carries with it, however, hints of the vastly greater powers that language in the full sense provides. If the builders can call "slab" when there are slabs present, they can also do so when they are absent. This indicates how uses of language can alter the intelligibility of a situation by contributing elements that would otherwise not appear on the scene, including non-existent or imaginary elements. Calls of "brick" when there are no more bricks could direct the builders to the need to engage in a very different practice, whereas calls of "unicorn" would presumably have a considerably different function in their lives. This power to invoke the absent, combined with the power of sayings to articulate meanings otherwise merely embedded in praxis, funds humans' ability to think their worlds, to deliberate explicitly on their situations and their possibilities.
Narrative, Argument, Theory
Once a social group is capable of simple sayings such as the builders' calls, their further development of more complex forms of language can develop. There are many modes of human language, a great many of which consist in variations on or combinations of the three we will consider here: narrative, argument, and theory. Narrating consists in telling the story about something that has happened, is happening, will happen, or could conceivably have happened. The grammatical and lexical resources necessary to narrate vastly exceed those available to Wittgenstein's builders, but the difference here is one of degree that functions as a difference in kind. Anyone who has tried to communicate in a foreign language she scarcely knows should have a sense of what it is like to try to tell a story supplied only with a small storehouse of words and no proper means of connecting them. One could nevertheless tell simple stories with such limited means, because people who are attuned to each other and their common practices can invoke their extensive holdings of shared meanings merely by hinting loosely at those meanings with a few stray words.
Narrative in the full sense improves on this sort of exchange by allowing the speaker to articulate a vastly greater amount of shared meaning. Sharing stories allows people to experience anew an event they experienced previously, often from someone else's perspective. Through such exchanges, speakers become fully hermeneutic beings, explicitly interpreting each other and their worlds, manifesting in words the backgrounds of otherwise unexplicated interpretations that define their praxis. By this means people can come to greater understandings of the meaning structures of their lives. Above we discussed how practices can be nested in extended networks of further practices and how someone's understanding of each practice grows with her appreciation of such contexts. By articulating these relationships in language, people can more effectively and imaginatively incorporate into their understanding of any particular practice the fuller meaning of that activity. To return to an earlier example, the nurses, doctors, and other workers, patients and visitors at a hospital do not merely act out various medical practices, they also tell each other stories about those practices. A patient may hear his doctor explain how the tests he is about to undergo fit into the diagnostic regimen that will determine his treatment. Then, after the doctor leaves, the patient may discuss with the nurse possible complications the doctor left out, how the insurance companies and administrators are conspiring to destroy health care in this country, and the successful recoveries of other patients with leaky heart valves. Such stories combine with the activities that they narrate, sometimes in complementary ways, sometimes as contrasts or challenges, to influence and motivate participants' senses of how they and others should behave in the present and future.
By offering speakers and their audiences a further mode of attending to their praxis, in addition to engaging in praxis itself, narrative facilitates contemplation, deliberation, and other means of taking a distancing stance on the steady flow of human activity. Such distancing can occur to different degrees, and typically ends with a return to the non-deliberative flow of activity by whoever has paused in his ordinary praxis, sometimes with a revised understanding of his situation or himself. The greater the distancing, the more difficult this transition back to ordinary praxis will typically prove to be. Much story telling fits neatly with ongoing praxis, or else plays a part in people's making sense of and coping with minor disturbances or breakdowns in their activities, such as encountering a rude person, dealing with a flat tire, or enduring an uncommonly boring and pointless meeting. Other narratives attempt to clarify the meanings of more perplexing parts of life, and accounts from the humanities, the social sciences, the natural sciences, and other areas of study all can have the power to shift and reconfigure their audiences' usual understandings.
These more formal stories usually go beyond standard narrative by incorporating arguments and by offering, drawing on, or expanding theories. Arguments can be directed at any aspect of praxis, or anything that appears in practices, but are noteworthy for the purposes of this essay particularly when they outline a proposal for practical intelligibility. That is, arguments can put into words what it should make sense for someone to do in particular or general situations. Such normative accounts can either reinforce or challenge the practical intelligibility already established in the practices they address. When combined with a narrative concerning the more general characteristics of those practices, ordinary arguments can serve as everyday theories, linking snippets of an informal ontology with the scraps of an equally informal epistemology, politics, or ethics. Theory develops out of the institutionalizing and formalizing of this sort of "folk theorizing."
Formal theories often go to the extreme of expecting their audiences to abandon many, though of necessity never all, of the ordinary understandings carried in their everyday practices about the topics of their study. This is as true in most branches of the social sciences and the humanities as it is in the natural sciences, but is clearest in fields such as physics, in which usual terms such as "work" and "force" take on specialized meanings, and the understandings labeled "folk physics" are simply rejected in favor of mathematical formulae that authoritatively specify the way that objects really fit into the physical operations of the universe. Similarly, economics and sociology offer models of human behavior that are typically designed to call into question established senses of how people do or should act. These theories can lead to new technologies, policies, and other innovations that restructure social practices, often in ways that are unpredictable even to those theories that attempt to chart the practical effects of other theories.
With the development of theory and the further additions of technologies and institutions that support and are supported by abstract theorizing, humans reach the apex of the powers they have achieved to date. They remain, as ever, embodied beings whose phenomenological, practical, and hermeneutic involvements in the world matter to them. The structuring of those involvements in their social practices also continues to serve as the necessary foundation for all the expansions and refinements of their understandings and undertakings. As beings capable of being at once theoretical and practical, however, humans have a peculiar relationship to themselves and to their worlds. Their ability to bring arguably all aspects of their praxis into question, and to provide theories that specify alternative ways of understanding and acting, entails a power to define and control their existence that carries with it a new sort of ethical responsibility. We propose a Gadamerian approach to discharging this responsibility in our closing section.
Dialogue
Contemporary human beings have an unprecedented capacity to alter themselves and their worlds through the application of theories and their associated technologies, techniques, and institutions. The goodness of such changes must be established by ethical inquiries specific to each situation. In general, however, we can note the danger inherent in this extensive power to disrupt the workings of everyday praxis. 10 To the extent that a theory removes its objects of study from their place in human practices, it makes those objects alien and problematizes their reabsorption into future human praxis. Various revolutions in the natural and social sciences indicate the power and potential benefits of this cycle of alienation and reabsorption. Our concluding issue in this essay concerns whether the disruptive character of this process can be minimized while preserving its potency and its beneficial possibilities. The Gadamerian concept of dialogue presents a promising model for how theory can foster new perspectives that fund praxis change, while still acknowledging and respecting the understandings already at work in social practices.
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For Gadamer, engaging in dialogue means participating in intercourse with the world, with others, and ultimately with oneself in an open, attuned way. Gadamer's model is the Platonic dialogues, in which Socrates and his interlocutors jointly inquire into some topic. Each participant brings his own background and experience to the issue, but each fixes directly upon the topic and allows his prior understanding of it to be tested by the force of contrary views. From successful dialogue emerges an entirely new way of thinking about, and even experiencing, the subject matter at hand.
Dialogue shares with more objectivist forms of theorizing an anti-conservativism, an openness to new ways of understanding familiar matters. It departs, for instance, from a strictly reductionist, "Galilean" approach to inquiry, first, in delving into the preestablished structures of human experiences rather than attempting to extricate itself from those structures at the outset. These pre-established structures are to be challenged and tested by way of their use in dialogue, not by evaluating them in accord with universals prior to inquiry. Dialogue, second, acknowledges that discoveries about its objects are bound up with the self-understandings of its participants. In competition here are two distinct conceptions of objectivity and transcendence. Theorizing modeled on traditional natural science attempts to achieve a final perspective on reality by escaping the confines of non-scientific understandings, whereas theorizing modeled on dialogue seeks to allow its objects of study to reveal their further, unpredictable possibilities that develop out of extant understandings, generating new understandings that will themselves prove to be finite and transcendable.
12 Dialogical inquiry grants greater independence to the object than other forms of theory. Because the latter fail to acknowledge the continuing influence of practice and history on inquiry, they end up imposing upon their objects sets of unchallenged assumptions.
Dialogue leaves values mixed with its grasp of facts. It recognizes that no attempt to understand or come to know the world is ever completely separable from the task of answering questions about how to live, even when the latter questions do not stand explicitly before consciousness. How even the natural sciences classify and order their objects, how they form hypotheses and design experiments to test them, are activities that shape and are shaped by humans' ordinary ethical and practical dealings with the world.
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To the extent that objectivist theory recognizes this embeddedness of the factual in the ethical, it conceives it as a problem to be overcome. Such theorizing attempts to rip its objects of study out of this morass and distill its findings into pure facts, which it then can reinsert into future human experience. A conception of theory committed to dialogue, in contrast, will allow the content of practices, which shapes all theorizing, to be challenged and modified in the very course of acquiring theoretical knowledge. A community of inquiry alert to the practical values entrenched in the pursuit of theoretical knowledge, and at least moderately committed to dialogue with other traditions of inquiry, such as those from the past or from other cultures, will be open to shifts in the structures of the background practices that largely determine its considerations of what counts as good inquiry.
We offer the attitudes and approaches of dialogue, its openness and care, as crucial counterweights, correctives, and complements to the raw power of non-dialogical theorizing. In its absence, this power constantly threatens to destabilize the very ground of praxis, leaving human beings needlessly and dangerously disoriented and alienated from each other and their situations.
14 As a species, as cultures, and as individuals, human beings develop in their meaningful engagement with the world, transcending and reinterpreting their situations and themselves in the process. Ethics in the broadest sense comes into question in these developments, from the most fundamental ethical concepts, such as "ought" and "care" and humans' understandings of who they are and what 12 Mulberry (2006) further articulates this finitistic conception of objectivity. 13 The resonances of these Gadamerian tenets with many leading ideas from Feminist philosophy of science are many. For a classic comparison, see Keller (1996) . 14 Comparison of this possibility with the ethically vacuous condition of (post)modernity outlined in "A Disquieting Suggestion" in MacIntyre (1984) is apt. Our analysis of this danger does not entail our commitment either to some sort of neo-Burkean conservativism or to an antirevolutionary liberalism. Some practices and praxis regimes in principle merit fighting against, even at the cost of great disruption to the established flow of praxis. In extreme cases, that "cost" is precisely the price that justice demands be paid. makes up their worlds, to the particular ways of life carried in social practices and the narratives, arguments, and theories that bolster and challenge those ways. We contend that it is also an ethical matter how ethics is questioned, the care, or lack of care, with which humans attempt to understand and change their circumstances. We advocate dialogue as a sound approach to the task of being human, the life of unending transcendence, reinterpretation, and change. 
